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ABSTRACT 
Economists have proposed a variety of sophisticated climate-change interventions.  But do our 
citizens care enough about climate change to enact such policies?  This paper provides evidence 
that suggests they do not.  Two kinds of findings are presented.  Using data on 40,000 
Europeans from the 2016 European Social Survey, the paper shows that only 5% of people say 
they are extremely worried about climate change.  The cooler European countries express 
particularly low levels of worry.  Using data on 30,000 citizens from the 2019 Eurobarometer 
Surveys, the paper demonstrates that climate change is viewed as a less important problem than 
parochial issues such as (i) health and social security, (ii) inflation, (iii) unemployment, and 
(iv) the economic situation.  Other results, from regression equations, are provided.  This 
paper’s conclusions seem to have exceptionally serious implications for our unborn great 
grandchildren -- and imply that economic policy should now focus on how to alter feelings 
rather than upon the design of complicated theoretical interventions.  An analogy with 
successful anti-tobacco policy is discussed.  
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Introduction 
If the world is to make progress in tackling anthropogenic global warming (Benton 
1970; Madden and Ramanathan 1980; Chapman and Khanna 2000; Deschenes and Greenstone 
2007; Stern 2007; Tol 2008; Deschenes and Kolstad 2011), human beings will have to alter 
how they live.  A range of ingenious policy ideas have been suggested by economists and other 
social scientists1.  Yet carefully crafted proposals are of little use if voters oppose them.  For 
innovative economic policies to garner enough support, citizens in democracies have to feel 
deeply committed to the desirability of action on climate change (because those are likely, in 
the short run, to be painful for them).   
Human feelings are therefore of crucial importance.  Yet at the time of writing such 
data are rarely studied2 by applied economists.  
This paper examines evidence on the feelings and beliefs of modern European citizens 
about climate change and closely related issues.  It draws upon information from two recent 
data sets – the European Social Survey in 2016 and the Eurobarometer Survey in 2019.  As 
Europe has some of the highest education levels in the world, the continent makes a natural 
testing ground for an empirical inquiry of this kind.  If Europeans are not severely worried, and 
are unconvinced of an urgent need for change, there is perhaps little reason to have optimism 
about most other parts of the world. 
                                                          
1 The modern literature includes Nordhaus 1991; Weitzman 2009; Hepburn et al. 2013; Stern 2015, 2018; Tol 
2009, 2018; Heal 2017; Hepburn and Teytelboym 2017; Weitzman 2017; Sachs 2019; Hepburn et al. 2020.   
2 Later sections will study human ‘worry’, for example, so honourable exceptions should be mentioned – including 
Ma et al. (2020), Ehlert et al. (2020), and Engelberg and Parsons (2016).  See also Bernstein et al. (2019), Baylis 
(2020), Mullins and White (2019), Powdthavee (2020), Bose et al. (2020), and Gibson and Mullins (2020).   
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Previous work on Europeans’ feelings about the climate-change phenomenon is scant.  
However, one is Loureiro and Allo (2020) on the study, using Twitter data, of sentiments.  It 
follows in the spirit of a pioneering form of Twitter analysis by Cody et al. (2015).  See also, 
on the measurement of attitudes and feelings, Weber (2010). 
This paper’s results are troubling.  Although they ask slightly different kinds of 
questions, both of the later data sets seem to tell broadly the same story.  The main findings, 
which could be seen alongside related older work such as by Bord et al. (1998), who at that 
time concluded that in the eyes of citizens “global warming is not a salient issue”, and by 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006), are: 
(i) Europeans do not exhibit high levels of worry about climate change (in the ESS 
survey, only 1 person in 20 describes themselves as extremely worried, for 
example). 
(ii) Europe’s citizens are more concerned -- in Eurobarometer data -- with 
parochial economic influences in their lives (they care more about health and 
social security, inflation, the general economic situation, and unemployment). 
(iii) Europeans do not have a strong belief -- in ESS data -- that joint action by 
energy users will help.  On one interpretation of the paper’s data, for example, 
large numbers of citizens may well take the view that the chances of success 
from even coordinated action is not much better than 50-50. 
(iv) A lack of concern about climate change is most evident -- in both data sets -- 
among males, the old, and those with low levels of education.  The cooler 
countries are the least concerned. 
(v) It would be wrong to say that Europeans are entirely complacent about climate 
change.   However, is not easy from these data sets to believe that Europe’s 
citizens care enough to accept painful anti-climate-change actions.  
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The paper later considers what kind of policies might help -- given the evidence on underlying 
beliefs and feelings. 
 This paper follows in the footsteps of research reviewed in articles such as Heal (2017) 
and Tol (2018), and is related to important earlier writings such as Poortinga et al. (2019) and 
Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2019), although the current paper’s main focus and key conclusions are 
different. 3  Oswald and Stern (2019) recently argued that more work by economists remains to 
be done; it drew attention to the fact that in the case of the distinguished Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, for example, there was no evidence the journal had ever published a paper on 
climate change.  A more general lack of research on climate change issues by social scientists, 
and management researchers in particular, was pointed out a decade ago in an article by 
Goodall (2008).  She collected bibliometric data on 60 journals across a wide range of social 
sciences, including the subject of economics, and drew gloomy conclusions.  Goodall and 
Oswald (2019) made the related point that since the year 2000 the 50 journals in the elite so-
called FT Journals list had published only 11 articles on species decline and biodiversity (out 
of 47,000 articles). 
 
Empirical Approach 
The data in this study are drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2016 and 
the Eurobarometer Survey in 2019.  These are large random-sample surveys that cover the 
continent of Europe. 
The first data set, the European Social Survey (ESS), is a biennial cross-national survey 
of attitudes and behaviour.  It was first established in 2001. The ESS uses cross-sectional, 
probability samples which are representative of all persons aged 15 and over resident within 
                                                          
3 At a more general level this paper fits alongside work on environmental economics such as Atkinson et al. 2012, 
Claborn and Brooks 2019, Levinson 2012, Luechinger 2009, and Maddison et al. 2019. 
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private households in each country.  Through time, the number of countries covered by the ESS 
has grown, and the 2016 sweep provides information on 29 nations (most of them coming from 
Western Europe).  Funded through the European Commission, the ESS survey is one of the 
main statistical sources that allows comparable cross-national comparisons for the continent of 
modern Europe.   To ensure that the ESS data can be used to make inferences about the general 
population, and to minimise the margin of error, each country must achieve a minimum 
effective sample size of 1500 (after discounting for design effects).  For smaller countries 
(those with a population of less than 2 million), this number is reduced to 800.  The ESS 
fieldwork period typically lasts at least six weeks within a five-month period (usually the period 
from September of the survey year to January of the following year) in each country. The 
National Coordinator (NC) is responsible for the national implementation of fieldwork, the 
monitoring of fieldwork and the deliverables.  The Survey Agency conducts the fieldwork 
according to the ESS specifications, provides information on the progress of fieldwork to make 
monitoring by the NC and the Core Scientific Team (CST) possible, and plays a supporting 
role in the preparation of deliverables.  More details are available through the official ESS 
website:  https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/faq.html. 
The 2016 sweep asked a number of questions about climate change.  This provides a 
total sample size of approximately 40,000 randomly selected men and women.  Although, at 
the time of writing, the ESS recently released another sweep of the data (for calendar year 
2018), the climate change questions were not repeated, although apparently they may be in the 
future. It is conceivable that there have been changes in ESS European attitudes since 2016, 
but this study must examine the data currently available. 
The second data set, the Eurobarometer survey, is one of a series with a cross-national 
longitudinal design, and was designed to compare and gauge trends within Member States of 
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the European Union. This survey series began in the early 1970s and is now carried out each 
autumn and spring.  
Although the range of questions has been expanded over the years, the programme aims 
to keep constant much of the content, so that data are reasonably comparable over time. Starting 
with Eurobarometer 34 (1990), separate supplementary surveys on special topics have been 
conducted almost every Eurobarometer wave. Special irregular modules have investigated 
topics such as agriculture, biotechnology, consumer behaviour, elderly people, energy, 
environment, family, gender issues, health, immigration, poverty, regional identity, science and 
technology, urban traffic, working conditions, youth, etc., and all from a European perspective.  
In the case of the Eurobarometer survey in 2019, various questions were asked -- including a 
mention of climate -- about the main problems that people thought their own country faced.  
Sample size is approximately 1000 citizens per nation.   
The 2019 survey used in this paper allows a total sample of approximately 29,000 
adults.  These data sets allow us to examine how randomly selected Europeans respond to 
questions such as:  
“How worried are you about climate change?” [Answers can lie on a one to five scale (denoted 
from Not At All Worried, Not Very Worried, Somewhat Worried, Very Worried, up to Extremely 
Worried).]  
“What do you think are the two most important issues facing (THIS COUNTRY) at the 
moment?” [Maximum 2 answers from the list: Crime; economic situation; inflation; taxation; 
unemployment; terrorism; housing; government debt; immigration; health and social security; 
the education system; pensions; the environment, climate and energy issues].                                      
 
Principal Findings from the European Social Survey 
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We begin with patterns in the ESS data.  Human beings’ feelings and beliefs do not, of 
course, come with cardinal units of measurement.  It is therefore necessary to use survey 
responses with care.4   
Figure 1 is one simple illustration of the nature of the continent’s, and indeed the 
world’s, problem.  Only a small percentage (5%) of European citizens report extreme worry 
about the changing climate (namely, the level coded as the fifth column in Figure 1).  Moreover, 
only approximately one quarter of Europeans put themselves in either of the two top categories 
of concern.  Instead, in answering the question How worried are you about climate change?, 
Europeans arrange themselves fairly smoothly across all the feasible answers.  There is little 
sign of skewness in the distribution (an environmentalist would hope to see strong negative 
skew).  Treating the answers cardinally, for expositional simplicity in tables, produces a mean 
worry score of 3.028 on a one-to-five scale in appendix Table A2, and the modal answer is 
‘somewhat worried’. 
Here we have paid attention to the words that humans use.  Yet might it be appropriate 
to take a more sanguine view of these survey responses?   
An optimist might argue in the following way.  Large numbers of citizens say they are 
somewhat concerned about the changing climate.  When people say ‘I am somewhat worried 
about climate change’, an optimist might propose that they are actually expressing a really 
strong level of concern -- one strong enough to mean a potentially painful climate-change 
policy could successfully be pushed through in western democracies.  On this interpretation, 
Europe might be severely worried about the changing climate but its citizens could simply be 
using mild language to describe the problem.  That possibility deserves to be taken 
scientifically seriously. 
                                                          
4 An extreme view might be that such information should be eschewed entirely.  However, that would mean 
turning our backs, as social scientists, on the crucial role of human feelings and beliefs.  Policymakers are not able 
to do that.  They have to fit around humans -- because in a democracy it is, of course, votes by citizens that 
ultimately determine action. 
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However, the second data set, the Eurobarometer Survey that is discussed later, helps 
us to adjudicate on, and throws some direct doubt upon, that type of optimistic interpretation.  
But even with the ESS data set itself, there are reasons to be doubtful of a sanguine account.  
First, it might be expected that the proportions of individuals who claim they care about 
climate change are over-estimates.  It is known that when humans respond to surveys they feel 
under pressure to give politically correct answers.  This is the famous problem of ‘social 
desirability bias’, Fisher (1993).  As the questions in the ESS survey data set may thus be 
interpreted by people as encouraging socially responsible answers (a form of so-called priming 
effect, where respondents are aware they are ‘meant’ to give a particular answer), the fact that 
there is no evidence of high levels of concern about the climate is suggestive of, below the 
surface, a potentially larger and hidden problem of climate-change complacency within the 
European population.   
Second, when faced with the pattern in Figure 1, an analyst who wanted to be optimistic 
might react in another way.  He or she might argue that humans are intrinsically reluctant in 
survey answers (i) to use the word ‘extremely’ or indeed (ii) to approach the upper end of any 
response scale.   
Again, there are reasons to be doubtful of that.  For example, the Appendix gives data 
on people’s responses in this same 2016 ESS survey about their feelings of satisfaction with 
life.  Here there is a much longer scale than the 5-point used for climate change.  On an integer 
band from zero to ten, where 10 is ‘I am extremely satisfied with my life’, ten percent of 
Europeans give the topmost score and say ‘extremely’ satisfied.  That is double the proportion 
of Europeans who report themselves ‘extremely’ worried about climate change.  Moreover, if 
we think of compressing the long 0-10 scale into quintiles similar to the worry scale of Figure 
1, it can be seen in the appendix that approximately 25% of all Europeans put themselves into 
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the top fifth of potential life-satisfaction answer (compared to the tiny 5% of Europeans who 
put themselves in the top fifth of answers about the changing climate). 
Nevertheless, an optimistic sceptic might still refuse to accept the apparently dark 
implications of these worry-data patterns.  Hence we return to this topic in a different and 
complementary way, with Eurobarometer data, in a later section. 
 
Do Europeans Think That Coordinated Action Would Work? 
A closely related issue is whether Europe’s citizens believe in the value of climate-
change policy.   
Figure 2 reports ESS data on people’s feelings about action.  It illustrates a further 
difficulty, and perhaps an ever deeper one, for modern society.  
Here the key survey question is ‘Imagine that large numbers of people limited their energy 
use. How likely do you think it is that this would reduce climate change?’ It can be seen in Figure 2 
that many Europeans are unconvinced that cooperative reductions in everyone’s use of energy 
would help – even though modern science would itself be clear that coordinated action on 
carbon emissions would slow the rise in global temperatures.   
In Figure 2’s pattern there is slightly more skewness than in Figure 1.  Even so, it 
appears to be much less than might be wished for by an environmentalist who was hoping to 
reverse climate change.  The mean score is 5.603 on a zero-to-ten cardinal scale (see Table A2 
in the Appendix), which is not reassuring from an environmentalist’s standpoint. 
Is there a way to calibrate the objective size of this phenomenon?  On the surface it is 
not possible to be certain how individuals view the answer scaling that they give in Figure 2.  
Yet one interpretation is numerical in spirit.  It comes in two parts.  First, survey respondents 
are asked about the likelihood of something (namely, their perception of the chance of reducing 
climate change through joint cuts in society’s use of energy).  In this case, the word ‘likelihood’ 
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can presumably be reasonably taken as synonymous with ‘probability’. Second, ESS 
respondents are presented with a cardinal scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely) 
along which they had to answer.  Responses close to 10 can presumably be taken as a signal 
that the person believes the event is close to being a certainty.  Answers close to zero are the 
reverse signal, namely, that the person thinks the event is virtually certain not to occur.  
On this quasi-cardinal interpretation, those respondents who mark around the middle of 
the x-axis on likelihood -- in the histogram in Figure 2 -- are presumably trying to signal that 
they view it as around a 0.5 probability that if large numbers of individuals limit their energy 
use then climate change will be reduced. The answer 5 out of 10, as the stated likelihood, is the 
modal answer in Europe.  That might be termed a 50-50 likelihood in common language.  
Unfortunately, a 50-50 figure might be viewed as troublingly low if the hope is to get large 
number of Europe’s citizens to sign up to substantial, and coordinated, action on anthropogenic 
climate change. 
  
Might Concern Have Risen More Recently? 
Could the fact that the ESS data are from a few years ago be of some comfort?  An 
optimistic commentator could hope that the level of worry about climate change may have 
increased since then.  
  We examine 2019 Eurobarometer data shortly.  However, the Pew Research Centre, 
at www.pewresearch.org, carries out a Global Attitudes Survey in a large number of countries 
(not only European) where respondents are asked each year whether climate change is "a major 
threat, minor threat or not a threat" to their countries (on Pew data, see also Lewis et al. 
2019).  Through the years 2016-2018, the proportion of people answering 'major threat' has 
increased (there are no full data currently for calendar year 2019).  This trend rise in the 
numbers is noticeable but of moderate size.  It is an increase of approximately 5.3 percentage 
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points of the population between 2016 and 2018 (from 62.99% to 68.52%).  The proportion of 
individuals thinking that it is no threat at all has remained roughly constant at approximately 
10%.  In terms of levels of concern about the changing climate, it is not easy to be certain how 
the different wordings in the Pew and ESS questions might be interpreted in a way completely 
consistent between the two data sets.  Citizens may feel that climate change is a potential threat 
without believing that anything needs currently be done.  There is also, as ever, the problem of 
‘social desirability bias’ in Pew answers.   Overall, however, we think it is reasonable to believe 
that future ESS surveys will show greater numbers of worried Europeans.   
Even if that turns out to be true, it would itself not solve the problem apparent in the 
paper’s Figure 2.  That figure provides information about belief in the usefulness of action.  It 
is not about citizens’ levels of underlying worry.  Even worried voters will resist carbon cuts if 
they think that coordinated behaviour will not work. 
 
Principal Findings from the Eurobarometer Survey 
We now turn to the second data set -- the Eurobarometer of 2019.  This asks respondents 
to choose among societal issues that they view as important.  For our purpose, the data set has 
a special advantage.  It asks respondents about their ranking of different kinds of problems in 
society.  A long list -- of 13 possibilities -- is offered in the survey.  Survey respondents have 
to state the two issues they see as of particular importance.   
As might be anticipated, different individuals stress different topics.  There is 
considerable heterogeneity.  Table 1 gives an overview of the data.  It reports the mean values 
for how many times each topic is mentioned by respondents.  The single most-mentioned 
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national problem is that of Health and Social Security: 25.8% of Europeans emphasize this.  
The least-mentioned national problem is that of Terrorism: 4.4% of Europeans emphasize this. 
In Table 1, the topic Environment, Climate and Energy Issues is fifth in the ranking of 
societal importance.  It is mentioned by 16.3% of Europeans.  In other words, approximately 
one in seven Europeans think of climate change as one of the two most important problems 
facing society.  Therefore climate-change concerns are lower than those about Health and 
Social Security, Inflation, the Economic Situation, and Unemployment.  For policy-makers and 
environmentalists, this implies that although climate-change concerns are not negligible it is 
parochial economic considerations that matter to people noticeably more than the climate issue. 
When viewed in this way, the results from the European Social Survey and the results 
from the Eurobarometer Survey paint an apparently consistent story.  There is, in the general 
population, some concern over the climate.  A small percentage of citizens really do put high 
weight on that issue.  But the typical citizen does not.  The typical citizen is instead focused on 
narrow economic interests. 
 
Regression Results 
What sort of individuals and nations are, and are not, concerned about climate change?  
To examine that, we estimate regression equations in which the dependent variable is a measure 
of concern. 
Using ESS data, Table 2 defines ‘substantially worried’ as meaning the person gave the 
survey answer Extremely or Very. Table 3 depicts a linear probability equation.  People’s 
characteristics are listed vertically on the left hand side of Table 3.  Positive coefficients in the 
vertical list imply a greater amount of significant worry.  The dependent variable in Table 3 is 
thus unity for those people -- just over a quarter of the ESS sample -- who report being either 
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extremely worried or very worried.  The base category (the people who are then zeroes) is for 
all other lower levels of worry.   
In Table 3, the key estimated results are that worry about climate change is greater 
among females (for example, the coefficient is 0.037 with a standard error of 0.005), the 
unemployed, those in good health, the young, ethnic minorities, the highly educated (with an 
especially large coefficient of 0.126 on higher tertiary education), those who are left-wing in 
their politics, and citizens of large cities. 
Table 4 is a similar kind of regression equation but now with 2019 Eurobarometer data.  
Women tend to put slightly greater weight on climate change as a major societal problem (the 
coefficient is 0.009 with a standard error of 0.004).  The old care far less than the young (for 
example, the coefficient on over-75-years-in-age is -0.051 with a standard error of 0.013).  The 
highly educated care more than those with little education (for example, the coefficient on 
educated-beyond-the-age-of-20 is 0.067 with a standard error of 0.007). 
Table 5 is an equivalent regression equation on people’s belief that coordinated cutting 
of energy use would be beneficial to climate change.  Many similar patterns of coefficient signs 
are found as in Table 3.  
Figure 3 turns from data on different kinds of people to data on different kinds of 
countries.  It reveals a potentially noteworthy pattern across nations.  Warmer places have 
citizens who worry more about climate change.  Here we use the regression in Table 3 to create 
what can be thought of as an adjusted country-worry coefficient.  That estimated coefficient is 
positively correlated with the average temperature in 2016 (the year of interview) in the 
country.  This finding is reminiscent of Donner and McDaniels (2013), who showed that, within 
the United States, people’s worry about climate change is influenced by recent temperatures 
that they have experienced in their local area.  See also Zander et al. (2019).   
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We checked that our result is not simply because Eastern Europe is colder than Western 
Europe. The same scatter plot, about worry and temperature, holds in the subsample for 
Western Europe alone (see the estimate in the footnotes for the Figure).   
There is also an upward sloping pattern in Figure 3.  However, there is an important 
caveat here.  In this case the positive gradient disappears when Eastern Europe is excluded.  A 
higher temperature -- even though it signals greater worry about global warming -- apparently 
does not truly make people more likely to believe in the success of cooperative action on 
climate change.   
One further fact should be recorded, because it may be relevant to the likely returns on 
an investment in altering voters’ attitudes.   
Using the ESS data set, it is possible to calculate the number of people who are both 
worried about climate change and who do not believe that the problem will be reduced by us 
all jointly restricting our use of energy.  The reason this group is particularly interesting is that 
these individuals might be viewed as fertile possibilities -- namely as potential switchers -- in 
a voting campaign for green policies.  The number of those in our data set is 3,764 men and 
women, which is a little below 10% of our sample.  To calculate the number, we used the 
'Imagine large numbers of people reduced energy use, how likely to reduce CC' question and 
assumed anyone with a value of 5 or less (out of ten) would think it is 'unlikely'.  Substantial 
worry is defined as answering in the top-2 categories out of five.  For the overlap group 
(substantial worry + not convinced of joint action’s effectiveness), a policymaker’s campaign 
would need only to change their perception of the effectiveness of everyone limiting their 
energy use.   
Finally, on those who think that collective action would be likely to work, but are not 
greatly worried (that is, not in the top-2 worry categories), there are 15,832 such people in the 
sample.  
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Conclusions 
The evidence in this paper suggests that Europeans do not greatly care about climate 
change.  The calculations draw on two recent sources that cover 70,000 randomly sampled 
males and females. 
It would be wrong to argue that Europe’s citizens are wholly complacent.  It should 
also be emphasized that there exists a small percentage of citizens who put very high weight 
on the issue of climate change.5  Nevertheless, the majority of the continent’s citizens are 
instead focused upon parochial economic matters that might affect their immediate lives: 
 Only 5% of European citizens, for example, say they are extremely worried 
about climate change. 
 Climate change is rated fifth in a ranking of societal problems. 
 Large numbers of Europeans say they do not believe that coordinated reductions 
in energy use would slow the rate of climate change. 
 Colder European countries tend to be the least concerned about climate change. 
How should economic policy-makers react to these troubling findings?  One approach 
to a solution might be -- although economists are little-used to thinking this way -- to exploit 
public-information programmes as a key policy instrument (as advocated in Weiss and 
Tschirhart 1994 and studies since).  This was, in part, the approach taken by the health 
authorities of the world on the issue of smoking, and there is randomized-controlled-trial 
evidence of its success in the domain of cigarette smoking cessation (for example, Brewer et 
al. 2016, Noar et al. 2016; Hall et al. 2020).  In that case, governments produced large amounts 
of public information on the dangers of smoking.  They provided their countries -- and still do 
                                                          
5 It would be useful if future research could ascertain whether this proportion rises when there is newspaper 
publicity about natural disasters like the Australian bush fires of 2019.   
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-- with fierce warnings about the need to quit cigarettes.  That kind of public-information 
programme was coupled with fiscal incentives.  Yet arguably it was the information 
programme that first changed people’s feelings and beliefs, and thereby, indirectly, allowed 
politicians eventually to push through the tax schemes on cigarette smoking. 
The findings in this study appear to present economists, the world, and especially our 
unborn great grandchildren, with a fundamental difficulty.  In a democracy, policy proposals 
have to build upon a platform of generalized assent in society.  There is little point in designing 
sophisticated economic policies for combatting climate change until voters feel that climate 
change is a deeply disturbing problem.  Currently, those voters do not. 
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Figure 1.  Europeans Do Not Exhibit High Levels of Worry About Climate Change. ESS Data 
[This figure uses the full European sample of approximately 40,000 adults] 
 
                    
Notes 
The vertical axis is in percentages of the population.  It draws on answers given in the 2016 European Social Survey to the 
question ‘How worried are you about climate change?’ Answers can lie on a one to five scale (marked from Not At All 
Worried, Not Very Worried, Somewhat Worried, Very Worried, up to Extremely Worried). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Europeans Do Not Think Climate Change Would Be Greatly Reduced if  
Everyone Limited Their Energy Use. ESS Data 
 
[This figure uses the full European sample of approximately 40,000 adults] 
 
 
Notes 
The vertical axis is in percentages of the population.  It draws on answers given in the 2016 European Social Survey to the 
question ‘Imagine that large numbers of people limited their energy use. How likely do you think it is that this would reduce 
climate change?’ Answers can lie on a zero to 10 scale (marked from Not At All Likely up to Extremely Likely). 
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Figure 3.  A Positive Correlation Between the Level of Worry About Climate Change and the 
Average Temperature in a Country. ESS Data 
 
[This figure uses the full European sample of approximately 40,000 adults] 
 
 
 
Notes 
The vertical axis draws on answers in the European Social Survey to the question ‘How worried are you about 
climate change?’ Answers can lie on a one to five scale (marked from Not At All Worried up to Extremely 
Worried). 
The dots in the figure are country-dummy coefficients calculated using a regression-equation specification as in 
Table 3.  The average temperature is from https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/download-data. 
If the East European nations are excluded here, the slope of the fitted line remains almost unchanged at y = -0.122 
+ 0.016x.  If Russia alone is excluded, the above gradient increases a little but the paper’s results are not greatly 
affected.   
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Figure 4.  A Positive Correlation Between the Belief in the Likelihood of Reduced Climate 
Change after Collective Limits and the Average Temperature in the Country. ESS Data 
 
[This figure uses the full European sample of approximately 40,000 adults] 
 
 
Notes 
The vertical axis draws on answers in the European Social Survey to the question ‘Imagine that large numbers of 
people limited their energy use. How likely do you think it is that this would reduce climate change?’ Answers 
can lie on a zero to 10 scale (marked from Not At All Likely up to Extremely Likely). 
The dots in the figure are country-dummy coefficients calculated using a regression-equation specification as in 
Table 5.  The average temperature is from https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/download-data. 
If the Eastern European nations are excluded here, the slope of the fitted line flattens considerably to y = 0.191 + 
0.001x. 
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Table 1.  
Measuring Europeans’ Feelings About Societal Issues: Ranked by Perceived Importance. 
Eurobarometer Data 
 
Variable  Mean SD  Mentioned  Not mentioned 
Health and social security .258 .437 7,447 21,452 
Rising prices / inflation / cost of living .236 .425 6.833 22,066 
Economic situation .184 .388 5,330 23,569 
Unemployment .183 .386 5,276 23,632 
The environment, climate and energy issues .163 .369 4,720 24,179 
Immigration .155 .362 4,468 24,431 
Pensions .144 .352 4,173 24,726 
Crime .113 .317 3,264 25,635 
The education system .11 .313 3,192 25,707 
Housing .104 .306 3,019 25,880 
Government debt .0952 .293 2,751 26,148 
Taxation .0812 .273 2,348 26,551 
Terrorism .0435 .203 1,256 27,643 
     
 
Notes 
 
The sample size (N) is 28,899. The answers are ordered according to frequency of being mentioned in response 
to the question: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? 
(Max. 2 answers)”. 
 
 Some answers are omitted from the above table: Don’t know ‘DK’, ‘Other (SPONTANEOUS)’ and ‘None 
(SPONTANEOUS)’.                                    
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Table 2. 
2a. Dependent-Variable Descriptions. ESS Data 
 
Variable Definition Coding in the Regression 
Substantially 
worried 
How worried are you 
about climate change? 
1 = “Extremely worried” 
and “Very worried”, 0 = 
“Somewhat worried”, 
“Not very worried”, and 
“Not at all worried” 
 
Collective 
limit’s likely 
effect 
 
Now imagine that large 
numbers of people limited 
their energy use. How 
likely do you think it is 
that this would reduce 
climate change?  
 
0 “Not at all likely” up to  
10 “Extremely likely” 
 
 
2b. Dependent-Variables: Summary Statistics. ESS Data  
 Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 Substantially worried* 41448 .274 .446 0 1 
 Collective limit’s likely effect 39048 5.603 2.301 0 10 
 
*Here ‘substantially worried’ is again coded as answering in the top-two categories out of five. 
  
27 
 
Table 3. 
Regression Equation for Substantially Worried About Climate Change. ESS Data 2016. 
 
 Substantially Worried 
  
Female 0.037*** 
 (0.005) 
Unemployed 0.069*** 
 (0.011) 
Good health -0.004 
 (0.007) 
Fair health 0.001 
 (0.008) 
Bad health 0.052*** 
 (0.011) 
Very bad health 0.075*** 
 (0.022) 
20-24 -0.040*** 
 (0.013) 
25-29 -0.045*** 
 (0.013) 
30-34 -0.039*** 
 (0.013) 
35-39 -0.041*** 
 (0.013) 
40-44 -0.056*** 
 (0.013) 
45-49 -0.056*** 
 (0.013) 
50-54 -0.048*** 
 (0.013) 
55-59 -0.009 
 (0.013) 
60+ -0.058*** 
 (0.011) 
Child home -0.007 
 (0.006) 
Ethnic minority 0.024*** 
 (0.009) 
Married -0.003 
 (0.005) 
Lower secondary educ. 0.037*** 
 (0.010) 
Lower tier upper sec. educ. 0.055*** 
 (0.010) 
Upper tier upper sec. educ. 0.082*** 
 (0.010) 
Advanced vocational, sub-deg. 0.074*** 
 (0.011) 
Lower tertiary educ. 0.127*** 
 (0.012) 
Higher tertiary educ. 0.126*** 
 (0.011) 
Ideology right-leaning -0.017*** 
 (0.001) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city 0.008 
 (0.009) 
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Town or small city -0.029*** 
 (0.007) 
Country village -0.033*** 
 (0.007) 
Farm or home in countryside -0.047*** 
 (0.013) 
  
Observations 35,819 
R-squared 0.089 
Prob > F <0.001 
Country Dummies Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Notes 
The dependent variable ‘Substantially worried’ is coded as 1 if the respondent gives either of the top-two worry 
categories (‘extremely’ or ‘very’) out of five categories.  See Table 2a, b. 
For simplicity, this is a linear-probability equation (a probit equation gives equivalent results). 
The regression sample excludes the 348 people who say that climate change is not happening.  The Appendix 
gives background information on their characteristics. 
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Table 4. 
Regression Equation for Who Considers Environment, Climate and Energy An 
Important Issue. Eurobarometer Data 2019. 
 
VARIABLES Climate is important 
  
Female 0.009** 
 (0.004) 
Unemployed -0.022** 
 (0.009) 
25-34 -0.002 
 (0.011) 
35-44 -0.010 
 (0.012) 
45-54 -0.018 
 (0.012) 
55-64 -0.013 
 (0.012) 
65-74 -0.032*** 
 (0.012) 
75+ -0.051*** 
 (0.013) 
Child home -0.003 
 (0.005) 
Married 0.012** 
 (0.005) 
16-19 Educ. Years 0.009 
 (0.007) 
20+ Educ. Years 0.067*** 
 (0.007) 
Still studying 0.096*** 
 (0.014) 
No full-time education -0.035 
 (0.023) 
Ideology right-leaning -0.010*** 
 (0.001) 
 
Observations 26,536 
R-squared 0.162 
Prob > F <0.001 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes 
(i) The dependent variable is coded as a dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 when an individual 
mentioned “The environment, climate and energy issues” when being asked about what they 
considered the two most important issues facing their country at the moment.  
(ii) For simplicity, this is a linear-probability equation (a probit equation gives equivalent results). 
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Table 5. 
Regression Equation for Beliefs About Whether Collective Limits Would Be Effective. 
ESS Data 2016. 
 
 Collective limit’s likely 
effectiveness 
  
Female 0.269*** 
 (0.024) 
Unemployed -0.090 
 (0.059) 
Good health -0.211*** 
 (0.034) 
Fair health -0.268*** 
 (0.039) 
Bad health -0.363*** 
 (0.058) 
Very bad health -0.660*** 
 (0.120) 
20-24 -0.319*** 
 (0.067) 
25-29 -0.620*** 
 (0.068) 
30-34 -0.595*** 
 (0.068) 
35-39 -0.499*** 
 (0.070) 
40-44 -0.413*** 
 (0.070) 
45-49 -0.545*** 
 (0.069) 
50-54 -0.595*** 
 (0.067) 
55-59 -0.388*** 
 (0.070) 
60+ -0.608*** 
 (0.058) 
Child home 0.078** 
 (0.031) 
Ethnic minority -0.012 
 (0.050) 
Married -0.038 
 (0.029) 
Lower secondary educ. 0.139*** 
 (0.051) 
Lower tier upper sec. 
educ. 
0.055 
 (0.055) 
Upper tier upper sec. 
educ. 
0.138*** 
 (0.053) 
Advanced vocational, 
sub-deg. 
0.186*** 
 (0.056) 
Lower tertiary educ. 0.306*** 
 (0.063) 
Higher tertiary educ. 0.366*** 
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 (0.056) 
Ideology -0.027*** 
 (0.006) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big 
city 
-0.012 
 (0.048) 
Town or small city -0.021 
 (0.035) 
Country village -0.063* 
 (0.036) 
Farm or home in 
countryside 
-0.133* 
 (0.068) 
  
Observations 34,235 
R-squared 0.061 
Prob > F <0.001 
Country Dummies Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes 
The dependent variable is coded cardinally from 0 up to 10.   
For simplicity, this is a linear-probability equation (a probit equation gives equivalent results). 
The regression sample excludes the 348 people who say that climate change is not happening. 
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APPENDIX TABLES FOR THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 
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Table A1.  
Measuring Europeans’ Beliefs About Climate Change: The ESS Questions 
[In the ESS data set, the questions below are asked of respondents in the same order as below.  Hence that 
ordering is maintained in later tables, even though the focus of the paper is on particular questions, as marked in 
italics.] 
 
Variable Definition Coding 
I think climate 
is not changing 
You may have heard the idea 
that the world’s climate is 
changing due to increases in 
temperature over the past 100 
years.  What is your personal 
opinion on this? Do you think 
the world’s climate is 
changing?  
                                          
1 “Definitely 
changing”; 2 
“Probably 
changing”; 3 
“Probably not 
changing”; 4 
“Definitely not 
changing” 
Cause of CC Do you think that climate 
change is caused by natural 
processes, human activity, or 
both? 
1 “Entirely by 
natural processes” up 
to  5 “Entirely by 
human activity” (55 
– “I don’t think 
climate change is 
happening) 
 
Personal 
responsibility 
To what extent do you feel a 
personal responsibility to try to 
reduce climate change? 
    
0 “Not at all” up to 
10 “A great deal” 
Level of worry How worried are you about 
climate change? 
1 “Not worried at 
all” up to 5 
“Extremely worried” 
 
Collective 
limit’s likely 
effectiveness 
Now imagine that large 
numbers of people limited their 
energy use. How likely do you 
think it is that this would 
reduce climate change?  
0 “Not at all likely” 
up to 10 “Extremely 
likely” 
Government 
enough 
And how likely do you think it 
is that governments in enough 
countries will take action that 
reduces climate change? 
 
0 “Not at all likely” 
up to 10 “Extremely 
likely” 
Own limit 
energy 
How likely do you think it is 
that limiting your own energy 
use would help reduce climate 
change? 
0 “Not at all likely” 
up to 10 “Extremely 
likely” 
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Table A2. Overall Sample: Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs. ESS Data 
  
 Variable  N  Mean SD  Min  Max 
I think climate is not changing 40746 1.511 .674 1 4 
Cause of CC 39743 3.422 .789 1 5 
Personal responsibility 39679 5.597 2.698 0 10 
Level of worry 40271 3.028 .924 1 5 
Collective limit’s likely effect 39048 5.603 2.301 0 10 
Government enough 38962 4.588 2.194 0 10 
Own limit energy 39508 4.356 2.631 0 10 
 
Table A3. By Gender: Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs. ESS Data 
 Males   Females  
Variable     N Mean   SD    N Mean SD 
I think climate is not changing 19299 1.537 .697  21447 1.488 .651 
Cause of CC 18788 3.424 .812  20955 3.42 .769 
Personal responsibility 18813 5.521 2.695  20866 5.666 2.699 
Level of worry 19007 2.973 .932  21264 3.077 .914 
Collective limit’s likely effect 18570 5.482 2.373  20478 5.713 2.227 
Government enough 18586 4.589 2.24  20376 4.587 2.151 
Own limit energy 18776 4.263 2.669  20732 4.441 2.592 
 
Table A4. By Region: Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs. ESS Data 
West East 
Variable   N   Mean   SD   N   Mean   SD 
I think climate not changing 29186 1.431 .613 11560 1.712 .771 
Cause of CC 28746 3.474 .766 10997 3.285 .832 
Personal responsibility 28764 6.088 2.52 10915 4.305 2.725 
Level of worry 29083 3.118 .898 11188 2.793 .949 
Collective limit’s likely 
effect 
28360 5.833 2.246 10688 4.993 2.333 
Government enough 28336 4.519 2.175 10626 4.773 2.235 
Own limit energy 28632 4.515 2.626 10876 3.939 2.597 
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Table A5. By Age (30 or Under vs Above 30): Summary Statistics on Europeans’ 
Beliefs. ESS Data 
Young (30 or under) Old (Above 30) 
Variable  N  Mean  SD N Mean SD 
I think climate not changing 7936 1.493 .674 32810 1.515 .674 
Cause of CC 7746 3.527 .787 31997 3.396 .788 
Personal responsibility 7751 5.568 2.567 31928 5.605 2.729 
Level of worry 7817 3.046 .936 32454 3.024 .921 
Collective limit’s likely effect 7656 5.761 2.221 31392 5.565 2.318 
Government enough 7653 4.621 2.148 31309 4.58 2.205 
Own limit energy 7722 4.35 2.553 31786 4.358 2.649 
 
Table A6. By Age (Under 25 vs Above 50): Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs. 
ESS Data 
Young (25 or under) Old (50 or above) 
Variable  N  Mean  SD N Mean SD 
I think climate not changing 5039 1.481 .67 20403 1.536 .671 
Cause of CC 4944 3.549 .778 19872 3.347 .79 
Personal responsibility 4935 5.567 2.509 19803 5.468 2.793 
Level of worry 4977 3.076 .935 20219 3.002 .928 
Collective limit’s likely effect 4871 5.856 2.183 19385 5.504 2.32 
Government enough 4860 4.673 2.131 19353 4.613 2.212 
Own limit energy 4909 4.383 2.517 19691 4.313 2.67 
 
Table A7. Young Educated Women (30 or under) vs Old Uneducated Men (50 or 
above): Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs. ESS Data 
Young Women (Under 30, degree) Old Men (50 or above, no degree) 
Variable  N  Mean  SD N Mean SD 
I think climate not changing 968 1.415 .629 7495 1.576 .7 
Cause of CC 947 3.58 .76 7279 3.345 .825 
Personal responsibility 942 6.32 2.339 7289 5.31 2.786 
Level of worry 953 3.239 .915 7405 2.93 .941 
Collective limit’s likely effect 938 6.108 2.102 7155 5.379 2.373 
Government enough 945 4.613 2.068 7171 4.59 2.262 
Own limit energy 946 4.667 2.534 7266 4.252 2.673 
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Table A8. The Variables Used as Controls in the Regressions. ESS Data  
 Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 Female 41448 .527 .499 0 1 
 Unemployed 41448 .04 .197 0 1 
 Health 41395 2.22 .909 1 5 
 Age 41325 49.268 18.543 15 100 
 Child home 41448 .342 .474 0 1 
 Ethnic minority 41448 .055 .228 0 1 
 Married 41448 .482 .5 0 1 
 Education 41325 3.986 1.853 1 7 
 Ideology 35952 5.118 2.182 0 10 
 Domicile 41398 2.94 1.213 1 5 
 
 
 
Table A9. Descriptions of Control Variables. ESS Data 
Variable Definition Coding 
Female Respondent’s gender 1 = “Female” – 0 “Male” 
Unemployed Doing last 7 days: 
unemployed, actively 
looking for job 
1 “Unemployed” – 0 
“Employed” 
Health Respondent’s 
subjective health 
1 = “Very good” up to 6 = 
“Very bad” 
Age Respondent’s age 
category 
1 = “15-20” up to 10 = “60+” 
Child home Children living at 
home or not 
1 = “Respondent lives with 
children at household grid” – 0 
“Does not” 
Ethnic 
minority 
Respondent 
belonging to a 
minority ethnic group 
 
1 = “Yes” – 0 = “No” 
Married Marital status 1 = “Married”, 0 = “Other” 
Education Generated variable: 
Highest level of 
education, ES - 
ISCED 
1 = “ES-ISCED I, less than 
lower secondary” – 7 = “ES-
ISCED V2, higher tertiary 
education, >= MA level” 
Ideology Left-Right self-
placement on the 
ideological scale 
0 = “Left” up to  10 = “Right” 
Domicile Domicile, 
respondent's 
description. 
1 = “Big city”; 2 = “Suburbs/ 
outskirts of a big city”; 3 = 
“Town or small city”; 4 = 
“Country 
Village”; 5 = “Farm or home in 
countryside” 
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Further Notes on the ESS Data 
The appendix lays out the answers to a number of other questions asked in the European 
Social Survey (and in the order of asking).  There could reasonably be different interpretations 
of these patterns, but one reading is as follows.   
First, there seems to be fairly considerable support in Europe for the broad idea that the 
climate is changing (see the mean of 1.511, and standard deviation of 0.674) in Table A2.  
Perhaps this is to be expected as many citizens have themselves lived through demonstrably 
warm recent summers.  Second, there is mild support for the view that climate change is 
anthropogenic and that people have some personal responsibility to do something about it in 
their own lives (see the means of 3.422 and 5.597 respectively).  Third, there is less support for 
the idea that governments will do enough, or that an individual, on his or her own, can 
contribute in any substantive way (see the means of 4.588 and 4.356 respectively).  
Nevertheless, the imputed cardinality here should be kept in mind as a potential weakness in 
any firmly held conclusions of this particular sort. 
Tables A3-A7 divide the data into a large number of sub-categories.  Broadly, these 
cross-tabulations show that concern about climate change is lower in Eastern Europe, among 
older people, among less-educated citizens, and among males when compared to females. 
Similar results are produced in a more formal way, for the two variables (worry and a 
belief in joint action) of particular interest in the current paper, in the regression equations of 
Tables 3-5.  The variables are defined and explained in the Appendix. 
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Table A10: An Example of the Use of ‘Extremely’…in Life Satisfaction Data 
Life Satisfaction  Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative % 
Extremely dissatisfied 435 1.05 1.05 
1 286 0.69 1.75 
2 688 1.67 3.41 
3 1,374 3.33 6.74 
4 1,634 3.96 10.70 
5 4,161 10.08 20.78 
6 3,936 9.54 30.32 
7 7,571 18.34 48.66 
8 10, 694 25.91 74.56 
9 6,240 15.12 89.68 
Extremely satisfied 4,260 10.32 100.00 
Notes 
The question of interest above draws on the answers given in the European Social Survey to the 
question ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ Answers 
lie on a 0 to 10 scale (marked from Extremely dissatisfied up to Extremely satisfied). The sample size 
used to produce the above table is 41,279 individuals. 
 
Table A11: The Characteristics of Those Who Say Climate Change is Not Happening 
 
Climate-change deniers: summary statistics  
 Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 Female 348 .511 .501 0 1 
 Unemployed 348 .023 .15 0 1 
 Health 347 2.427 .987 1 5 
 Age 344 49.067 18.977 15 93 
 Child home 348 .319 .467 0 1 
 Ethnic minority 348 .164 .371 0 1 
 Married 348 .46 .499 0 1 
 Education 348 3.882 1.857 1 7 
 Ideology 246 5.354 2.476 0 10 
 Domicile 348 2.586 1.28 1 5 
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Table A12. Measuring European’s Preferences About Climate Change: The Eurobarometer 
Questions  
Variable Definition Coding 
Climate 
important  
What do you think are the two most 
important issues facing (OUR 
COUNTRY) at the moment? (Max. 2 
answers)                                        
1 “The environment, climate 
and energy issues”; 0 “Not 
mentioned” 
   
Climate 
personal 
issue 
And personally, what are the two most 
important issues you are facing at the 
moment? (Max. 2 answers) 
 
1 “The environment, climate 
and energy issues”; 0 “Not 
mentioned” 
Energy 
Union 
Priority: 
[X] 
In your opinion, which of the following 
objectives should be given top priority In 
a European Union energy union? (max 3 
answers). Three answers considered, 
defined as [X], are: “Environmental 
protection”, “Fighting global warming”, 
and “Renewable energy”. Separate 
dummy variables constructed for each 
answer. 
1 “[X] mentioned in answer”; 
0 “Not mentioned”. 
[X] 
important: 
EU 
What do you think are the two most 
important issues facing the EU at the 
moment? Answers considered ([X]) are 
“The environment” and “Climate 
change”. Two separate dummy 
variables. 
1 “[X] mentioned in answer”; 
0 “Not mentioned” 
EU-level 
decisions: 
climate 
For each of the following areas, please 
tell me if you believe that more decision‐
making should take place at a European 
level or on the contrary that less 
decision‐making should take place at a 
European level. The answer considered 
is “Protecting the environment”. 
1 “More decision-making at 
European level”; 2 “Less 
decision-making at European 
Level”; 3 “No change is 
needed (SPONTANEOUS)” 
Voting 
reason: 
climate 
Which are the issues which made you 
vote in the recent European Parliament 
elections? Firstly? Answer considered: 
“Combating climate change and 
protecting the environment” 
1 “Combating climate change 
and protecting the 
environment”; 0 “Other” 
Issue dev. 
countries: 
climate 
Which of the following challenges do 
you consider the most pressing for the 
future of developing countries? The 
answer considered is “Environmental 
protection and climate change” 
1 “Environmental protection 
and climate change”; 0 
“Other” 
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Table A13. The Variables Used as Controls in the Regressions: Eurobarometer 
 
 Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 Female 29,304 .534 .499 0 1 
 Unemployed 29,304 .044 .246 0 1 
 Age 29,304 50.0 18.1 15 98 
 Child home 29,304 .378 .485 0 1 
 Married 29,304 .530 .499 0 1 
 Education 29,304 2.37 .839 1 5 
 Ideology 26,536 5.27 2.36 1 10 
 
Note: Age is presented in its uncategorized version, i.e. in the regression equation we use a 7 -
level version of age dummies. 
 
Table A14. Descriptions of Control Variables: Eurobarometer 
Variable Definition Coding 
Female Respondent’s gender 1 = “Female” – 0 “Male” 
Unemployed Respondent’s current 
occupation: unemployed 
or currently not working. 
1 “Unemployed” – 0 
“Employed” 
Age Respondent’s age category 1 = “15-24” up to 7 = “75+” 
Child home Respondent part of single 
household with children or 
multiple household with 
children. 
1 = “Respondent lives with 
children at household grid” 
– 0 “Does not” 
Married Marital status (Married or 
Re-married) 
1 = “Married”, 0 = “Other” 
Education Respondent’s age when 
stopped full-time 
education, recoded into 5 
categories. 
1 = “Up to 15”; 2 = “16-
19”; 3 = “20+”; 4 = “Still 
studying”, 5= “No full-time 
education”;  
Ideology Left-Right self-placement 
on the 
ideological scale 
1 = “Left” up to  10 = 
“Right” 
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Table A15. Overall Sample: Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs: Eurobarometer 
  
 Variable  N  Mean SD  Min  Max 
Climate important 28,899 .163 .369 0 1 
Climate personal issue 28,899 .117 .322 0 1 
Energy union: env. prot. 24,707 .402 .49 0 1 
Energy union: glob. warm. 24,707 .353 .48 0 1 
Energy union: ren. energy 24,707 .449 .49 0 1 
Environment important: EU 24,707 .123 .33 0 1 
Climate change important: EU 24,707 .220 .414 0 1 
EU-level decisions: climate 23,806 1.23 .48 1 3 
Voting reason: climate 29,304 0.067 .25 0 1 
Issue dev. countries: climate 24,707 .122 .33 0 1 
The above table examines climate change and environment-related variables in the 
Eurobarometer, as defined by the previous table. 
 
 
Table A16. By Gender: Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs: Eurobarometer  
  
 Males Females 
 Variable  N  Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Climate important 13,663 .164 .37 15,641 .159 .37 
Climate personal issue 13,464 .122 .33 15,435 .113 .32 
Energy union: env. prot. 11,337 .372 .48 13,370 .429 .49 
Energy union: glob. warm. 11,337 .336 .47 13,370 .366 .48 
Energy union: ren. energy 11,337 .468 .49 13,370 .433 .49 
Environment important: EU 13,663 .102 .30 15,641 .105 .31 
Climate change important: EU 13,663 .177 .38 15,641 .193 .39 
EU-level decisions: climate 11,013 1.24 .48 12,793 1.23 .48 
Voting reason: climate 13,663 .0651 .25 15,641 .0687 .25 
Issue dev. countries: climate 11,337 .124 .33 13,370 .120 .33 
The above table examines climate change and environment-related variables in the 
Eurobarometer, as defined by the previous table, summarizing them by gender. 
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Table A17. By Region: Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs: Eurobarometer  
  
 West East 
 Variable  N  Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Climate important 19,647 .191 .39 9,657 .0998 .29 
Climate personal issue 19,242 .144 .35 9,657 .0646 .24 
Energy union: env. prot. 16,015 .434 .49 8,692 .345 .48 
Energy union: glob. warm. 16,015 .399 .49 8,692 .267 .44 
Energy union: ren. energy 16,015 .514 .49 8,692 .329 .47 
Environment important: EU 19,647 .116 .32 9,657 .077 .27 
Climate change important: EU 19,647 .206 .40 9,657 .143 .35 
EU-level decisions: climate 15,542 1.19 .44 8,264 1.31 .53 
Voting reason: climate 19,647 .087 .29 9,657 .026 .35 
Issue dev. countries: climate 16,015 .125 .33 8,692 .117 .32 
The above table examines climate change and environment-related variables in the 
Eurobarometer, as defined by the previous table, summarizing them by European region. East: 
Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Albania, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia. 
 
 
Table A18. By Age (30 or Under vs Above 30): Summary Statistics on Europeans’ 
Beliefs - Eurobarometer 
  
 Young (30 or under) Old (30 or above) 
 Variable  N  Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Climate important 5,301 .168 .37 24,003 .159 .37 
Climate personal issue 5,139 .123 .33 23,760 .116 .32 
Energy union: env. prot. 3,891 .46 .49 20,816 .392 .49 
Energy union: glob. warm. 5,891 .408 .49 20,816 .342 .47 
Energy union: ren. energy 5,891 .479 .49 20,816 .444 .49 
Environment important: EU 5,301 .111 .31 24,003 .102 .30 
Climate change important: EU 5,301 .179 .38 24,003 .187 .39 
EU-level decisions: climate 3,734 1.19 .45 20,072 1.24 .48 
Voting reason: climate 5,301 .058 .23 24,003 .0689 .25 
Issue dev. countries: climate 3,891 .119 .35 20,816 .119 .32 
The above table examines climate change and environment-related variables in the 
Eurobarometer, as defined by the previous table, summarizing them by age classification 
(under and equal to 30 are compared with over and above 30). 
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Table A19. By Age (25 or Under vs 50 or Above): Summary Statistics on Europeans’ 
Beliefs: Eurobarometer 
  
 Young (25 or under) Old (50 or above) 
 Variable  N  Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Climate important 3,238 .176 .38 15,241 .166 .37 
Climate personal issue 3,131 .133 .34 15,127 .118 .32 
Energy union: env. prot. 2,422 .474 .49 13.802 .393 .49 
Energy union: glob. warm. 2,422 .420 .49 13,802 .337 .47 
Energy union: ren. energy 2,422 .476 .49 13,802 .433 .49 
Environment important: EU 3,238 .123 .33 15,241 .101 .30 
Climate change important: EU 3,238 .187 .39 15,241 .195 .39 
EU-level decisions: climate 2,309 1.18 .44 13,251 1.25 .48 
Voting reason: climate 3,238 .0565 .23 15,241 .071 .26 
Issue dev. countries: climate 2,422 .139 .35 13,802 .110 .31 
The above table examines climate change and environment-related variables in the 
Eurobarometer, as summarizing them by age classification (under and equal 25 compared to 
over or equal to 50 years of age). 
 
Table A20. Young Educated Women (30 or Under) vs Old Uneducated Men (50 or 
Above): Summary Statistics on Europeans’ Beliefs: Eurobarometer 
  
 Young Women (Under 30, university) Old (50 or above, no university) 
 Variable  N  Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Climate important 5,505 .223 .42 8,874 .124 .33 
Climate personal issue 5,424 .168 .37 8,758 .090 .29 
Energy union: env. prot. 4,883 .458 .49 7,155 .368 .48 
Energy union: glob. warm. 4,883 .417 .49 7,155 .321 .47 
Energy union: ren. energy 4,883 .523 .49 7,155 .430 .49 
Environment important: EU 5,505 .133 .34 8,874 .092 .29 
Climate change important: EU 5,505 .259 .44 8,874 .151 .36 
EU-level decisions: climate 4,755 1.19 .45 6,893 1.27 .49 
Voting reason: climate 5,505 .113 .32 8,874 .039 .20 
Issue dev. countries: climate 4,883 .138 .35 7,155 .112 .31 
The above table examines climate change and environment-related variables in the 
Eurobarometer, summarizing them on a three-dimensional basis considering the age, education 
and the gender of the respondent. “University” is defined as an individual having finished their 
formal education at an age of above 20, whereas no university is attributed otherwise (still 
studying or having finished before the age of 20). 
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Supplementary Figure: Temperature Over 140 Years 
 
Global mean surface temperature from 1880 to 2018, relative to the 1951-1980 mean. The 
black line is the global annual mean, and the red line is the five-year local regression line. 
The blue bars show a 95% confidence interval.  Source: Oswald and Stern (2019) 
 
